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THE CHANGING NATURE OF LABOR UNREST 
IN CHINA
MANFRED ELFSTROM AND SAROSH KURUVILLA*
A qualitative shift is underway in the nature of labor protest in 
China. Contrary to prior literature that characterized strikes as 
being largely defensive in nature, the authors suggest that since 
2008, Chinese workers have been striking offensively for more 
money, better working conditions, and more respect from employ-
ers. They explain these developments using a “political process” 
model that suggests economic and political opportunities are send-
ing “cognitive cues” to workers that they have increased leverage, 
leading them to be more assertive in their demands. Such cues in-
clude a growing labor shortage, new labor laws, and new media 
openness. Their argument is supported by a unique data set of 
strikes that the authors collected, two case studies of strikes in aero-
space factories, and interviews with a variety of employment rela-
tions stakeholders.
Following the mishandling of an employee during June 2010, some 1,700 workers at a Honda parts plant in Zhongshan, Guangdong Province, 
went on strike, calling for higher wages, better working conditions, and a 
more representative union. More recently, in January 2012, more than 2,000 
workers at the state- owned Pangang Group Chengdu Steel and Vanadium 
Company struck, demanding a raise, more stable contracts, and the dis-
missal of “lazy, redundant personnel” (managers) (China Labor Watch 2012). 
The Honda and Pangang cases were different in several aspects: the employ-
ees involved were, respectively, migrants from the countryside and local 
residents; the factories’ ownership, respectively, was foreign private and 
state owned; and their locations, respectively, were the southeastern coast 
that has benefited the most from market reforms and the late- developing 
interior. Nonetheless, the workers' stances in both cases were surprisingly 
similar and epitomize what we argue is an important qualitative shift under-
way in Chinese industrial unrest: labor going on the offensive.
*Manfred Elfstrom is a PhD student in the Department of Government at Cornell University. Sarosh 
Kuruvilla is a Professor in the ILR School at Cornell University. The authors are grateful for the com-
ments they received on previous drafts of this article from Marc Blecher, Sun- wook Chung, Ileen Devault, 
Eli Friedman, Mary Gallagher, Kun- Chin Lin, Mingwei Liu, Sidney Tarrow, Kan Wang, and others, as well 
as three anonymous reviewers. Support from the Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies and the 
ILR School at Cornell, as well as a Hu Shih Memorial Travel Grant from Cornell’s East Asia Program, 
made the research possible. The raw data regarding strikes and transcripts of our interviews are available 
from Sarosh Kuruvilla at sck4@cornell.edu.
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Using a “political process” model adapted from McAdam (1999), we sug-
gest that structural and political opportunities (changes in the economy, 
notably a growing labor shortage, and changes in the country's “political op-
portunity structure,” including new labor laws and new government policies 
on “mass incidents” and press freedom) have provided workers with cogni-
tive cues that they possess increased leverage and space to be more assertive. 
In the absence of government strike statistics, we utilize a specially con-
structed crowd- mapped data set to show that the number of labor “inci-
dents” in China is large and increasing, and that the incidents are distributed 
across all regions. In addition, we draw on two mini case studies of strikes in 
the aerospace industry and 30 interviews with a variety of employment rela-
tions stakeholders to suggest that Chinese workers are increasingly using 
strikes and protests proactively to demand higher wages, better working 
conditions, and increased respect from employers.
We contribute to existing literature in three ways. First, we introduce a 
fresh model for understanding changes in worker demands and actions in 
China. Second, we provide new data on the number and nature of strikes 
related to employment conditions in the country since 2008. Finally, our 
finding that workers are striking “offensively” differs sharply from the pre-
vailing scholarly depiction of Chinese labor activism as defensive, while of-
fering new evidence for the claims of a small but growing number of 
researchers who posit that the world’s largest working class is becoming 
more assertive.
Relevant Literature
Estimates of Unrest
While precise figures on strikes and protests in China are unavailable,1 pop-
ular unrest of all types, including labor issues, land struggles, environmental 
disputes, and so forth, has risen steadily over the past two decades, from 
9,000 separate “mass incidents” (the state’s term for strikes, protests, and 
riots) in 1994 to 87,000 in 2005, the last time the government released 
 figures, to 127,000 in 2008, according to a leaked report (Tanner 2004; 
Wedeman 2009). How many of these incidents, though, are related to labor 
issues is unclear.
In the absence of official data, academics and civil society groups have 
stepped in to fill the void. Wedeman (2009) assembled a database of 947 
“mass incidents” reported in news articles from 1990 to 2008 and found 345 
1 The legality of striking is ambiguous (Taylor, Chang, and Li 2003: 33). The positive right to strike was 
removed from the Chinese Constitution in 1982. Feng (2011) argued that Article 27 of the 2001 Trade 
Union Law nonetheless implies that strikes are legal. A clause in Shenzhen’s 2008 “harmonious labor 
relations” legislation tasked unions with representing workers in “negotiations” (rather than mere “con-
sultations,” as in the Trade Union Law) in the event of a “work stoppage” or “slowdown” (China Labour 
Bulletin 2008b). However, China also has rules in place that prohibit, for example, “gathering a crowd to 
disturb public order” (Articles 290–292 of the 1997 Criminal Law).
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incidents (36.7% of the total number of incidents) involving workers and 
employment issues. (Farmers come in second with 229 incidents or 24.21% 
of the total.) Chen (2009), relying on a variety of news reports, recorded 
1,097 mass incidents occurring between 1997 and 2007, of which 355 in-
volved workers. In a similar vein, China Labour Bulletin (2012) collected 
news reports of worker protests between 2000 and 2010, counting 553 inci-
dents. These tallies undoubtedly understated reality. Sociologist Yu Jianrong 
(China Labour Bulletin 2011a) estimated that roughly 30,000 strikes and 
protests by workers occurred in 2009 alone—a number that roughly matches 
the figure obtained when the percentages of Wedeman and Chen’s “mass 
incidents” that relate to labor disputes (36.7% and 32.3%, respectively) are 
projected onto the total number of incidents that the government acknowl-
edged occurred in 2005 (87,000 incidents).
Government employment- dispute data show a clear upward trajectory as 
well. Data from arbitration panels and courts reveal an increase in the num-
ber of formally settled labor cases, with the greatest spike coming in 2008 
when such cases nearly doubled over the year before (from 350,182 to 
693,495 separate cases) and involved 1.2 million workers (P.R.C. Department 
of Population and Employment Statistics 2011). Labor- dispute numbers 
have settled only somewhat after the financial crisis, falling to 600,865 
cases and 815,121 workers in 2010 (P.R.C. Department of Population and 
Employment Statistics 2011). Figure 1 shows “mass incidents” through 2008 
Figure 1. “Mass Incidents” and Labor Disputes Accepted for Mediation, Arbitration, and 
Court, 1993–2010
Sources: China Labour Statistical Yearbook (2011); Tanner (2004, 2005); Wedeman (2009).
Note: Labor dispute figures are on the left axis, while “mass incident” figures are on the right axis.
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and labor disputes accepted for mediation, arbitration, and courts through 
2010. Silver and Zhang (2009: 174) aptly called China “an emerging epicen-
ter of world labor unrest.” Friedman (2012) went further, dubbing the 
country “undeniably the epicenter of global labor unrest” (emphasis added).
Causes and Nature of Labor Protest
Prior literature characterizes Chinese strikes and protests as being “reactive” 
or “defensive.” This is especially true for workers in state- owned enterprises 
(SOEs), which were dramatically restructured in the late 1990s and early 
2000s (Gallagher 2005). Park and Cai (2011) noted that while SOEs ac-
counted for 80% of urban employment in 1978, this figure declined to less 
than 30% by 2005. In just one year, 1997, SOEs lost about 13 million jobs, 
while 39% of urban households experienced a drop in income (Hassard et 
al. 2007: 86–87, 157), even as the state simultaneously withdrew “in the areas 
of social reproduction and social protection” (Pun, Chan, and Chan 2010: 
133). Workers, who may once have turned down university educations for 
the promise of lifetime employment on the production line (Blecher 2002: 
286), fell in one generation from being “master to mendicant” (Solinger 
2004). Chen (2000), Lee (2002, 2007), Weston (2004), and Hurst (2009) 
argued that “subsistence crises,” corruption, and a profound sense of be-
trayal at the dissolution of the Mao- era “socialist social contract” drove SOE 
employees into the streets in the late 1990s and early 2000s—what Lee 
(2007) called “protests of desperation.”
The late 1990s also witnessed an increase in resistance by migrant work-
ers in coastal export- oriented factories. Migrant workers’ grievances are de-
scribed as not being about unfulfilled promises from the past—coming 
from the countryside, these people were never given such promises—but 
rather institutional “discrimination” (Lee 2007) in the form of limited rights 
to urban social insurance and schools for their children, combined with 
rampant violations of China’s basic statutory protections (Chan 2001; Pun 
2005). Although migrant workers resort to wildcat strikes at times, they are 
said to resort to legal routes to justice (more than their SOE counterparts), 
often by way of labor nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (Chan 2006; 
Halegua 2008; Friedman and Lee 2010; Lee and Shen 2011). Their reliance 
on the law and NGOs has been alternately praised as empowering and effec-
tive at pressuring state institutions (Chan 2006; Halegua 2008; Clarke and 
Pringle 2009) and criticized as overly individualistic and easily co- opted by 
the same institutions (Pun et al. 2010; Lee and Shen 2011; Chen and Xu 
2012). Regardless, the activism of migrants, like that of SOE workers, is seen 
as reactive, as a request that the minimums of an existing system be upheld.
Along with adopting a generally “defensive” posture, Chinese workers are 
described as varying in their activism by region, by their relationships with 
local authorities, by the different managerial regimes under which they labor, 
and by their own networks and connections (Perry 2002). Lee (2007), Hurst 
(2009), and Blecher (2010) all map broad regional differences, particularly 
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between the northeast and southeast, inland and coast. Su and He (2010: 
162) highlighted variation in activism based on the reaction of local author-
ities “who maintain a close, if not downright collusive, relationship with em-
ployers and thus will often take their side.” Chen and Xu (2012), though, 
noted that governments are also under intense pressure to actively reduce 
social instability, leading to different local mixes of accommodation and 
confrontation. Zhang (2008: 40–41) and Lüthje (2012) highlighted differ-
ences across managerial regimes, while Cooke (2008: 125) found that labor 
disputes were disproportionately high in foreign- invested (and Hong Kong–, 
Macau- , and Taiwan- invested) enterprises. Workers were further said to be 
divided by recruitment networks based on hometown ties and connections 
(Lee 1998; Sargeson 1999) and by dormitory regimes that put workers out 
of reach of “geographically rooted norms” and “localized practices” (Pun 
and Smith 2007). These divisions can reduce the information that workers 
acquire about both protest and legal- advocacy techniques (Becker 2012). 
Consequently, and as a result of a well- founded fear of repression (Lee 2002: 
210, 2007; Weston 2004; Pan 2009), with very few exceptions (e.g., Chan 
and Pun 2009) “few people are willing to take the lead to organize cross- 
factory action” (Cai 2002: 340), and strikes are “fundamentally cellular in 
the sense that the ‘cells’ are not combining to form ‘tissues’” (Friedman and 
Lee 2010: 521).
Against this rough consensus, a small number of scholars have argued 
that an important shift is underway in worker activism. Chan and Pun 
(2009), Clarke and Pringle (2009), A. Chan (2010), C. Chan (2010), Butollo 
and ten Brink (2012), and China Labour Bulletin (2012) have all posited 
that labor protests are increasingly interest based rather than rights or social 
contract based. These claims echo the prediction of Silver (2003: 106), who 
wrote in her survey of world labor unrest a decade ago that “the growing 
labor unrest in China to date has largely taken the form of Polanyi- type 
movements against the disruption of established ways of life and livelihood” 
but there is “every reason to expect that Marx- type labor unrest will also 
emerge,” that is, unrest will switch to an increased reliance on shop floor 
“bargaining power.”
Applying a different framework, we investigate whether such a change is 
indeed taking place and why. In line with the new scholarship noted above, 
we find that Chinese workers are now increasingly acting “offensively,” for 
example, for progressive improvements in wages and working conditions. 
Our definition of “offensive” overlaps somewhat with the “proactive” (as op-
posed to “competitive” or “reactive”) category in Tilly’s (1976) schema of 
different claims made by collective actors but is most consistent with indus-
trial relations literature, such as Stearns’s (1974) categorization of strike de-
mands along a scale of sophistication. Per Stearns, “the lowest level consists 
of strictly defensive wage strikes; next comes strikes over personal issues; 
next, defensive strikes over conditions and intermediate wages and hours 
strikes; next, genuinely offensive wage strikes, the often related demands for 
reduction of hours, and on occasion union and solidarity issues” (24).
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Theory and Argument
Clearly, no “organized labor movement” is thriving in China nor is a “social 
movement” as defined by Tilly and Tarrow (2007).2 Our challenge there-
fore is to explain an apparent shift in worker aims and actions without the 
uni fying force of a trade union or a social movement behind them—what 
C. Chan (2010) called “class struggle without class organization.” To do 
this, we use McAdam’s (1999) “political process” model, based on the ex-
perience of the U.S. civil rights movement. Accordingly, structural (eco-
nomic) developments (the decline of Big Cotton and northward migration 
of African Americans in McAdam’s case) and political openings (them-
selves the result of economic changes) lead to a new sense of possibility 
and therefore a new assertiveness on the part of an oppressed group by 
means of a process of “continuous” change. McAdam noted that “the al-
tered response of elites to a particular challenger serve to transform evolv-
ing political conditions into a set of ‘cognitive’ cues, signifying to insurgents 
the political system is becoming increasingly vulnerable to challenge” (49). 
The simultaneous growth of “indigenous organizations” provides a forum 
for reinforcing those cues, leading to “cognitive liberation” and the birth 
of a full- fledged social movement. Strategic decisions, especially alliances 
with other groups, thereafter determine the longevity of the “insurgency.”
For McAdam’s model to be applicable to the Chinese labor context, we 
would expect certain factors to be present. First, economic and political 
factors that influence workers’ bargaining power should exist. We identify 
China’s growing labor shortage as the key economic factor driving in-
creased worker activism, and the government’s changing labor laws and 
responses to unrest as the key political factors. Second, the importance of 
these factors should be conveyed to workers through “cognitive cues.” We 
point to “cues” in the form of new company recruitment policies and 
higher wages, on the one hand, and increased press coverage of legal activ-
ism and “mass incidents,” on the other. Unlike McAdam, who adopted a 
traditional structural priority of economics over politics, we treat these two 
factors (see Figure 2) as equal drivers of labor unrest, since we believe that 
Chinese legal reforms and decisions to deploy police against strikers or 
allow media to report on strikes are driven as much by concern for the 
stability of the regime as they are by economic pressures from businesses. 
The ways in which unrest, in turn, affects the structural and political basis 
for further mobilization (the arrows in Figure 2) are beyond the article’s 
canvass.
2 Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 111) described a social movement as “a sustained campaign of claim making, 
using repeated performances that advertise the claim, based on organizations, networks, traditions, and 
solidarities that sustain these activities.” While labor activism in China certainly features performances, 
strikes, organizations such as labor NGOs, and networks such as native- place associations, it does not yet 
meet Tilly and Tarrow’s core condition of constituting a “sustained campaign of claim making,” for two 
reasons. First, strikes and protests by Chinese workers are not “sustained,” typically lasting only hours or 
days. Second, they do not join together to form a “campaign.”
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Economic and Political Factors
The key economic change relevant here is China’s development of a labor 
shortage since the early 2000s (Barboza 2006; Rapoza 2011). Although the 
2008 financial crisis delayed the shortage’s full impact, a lack of workers is 
currently evident in the Pearl River Delta, the Yangtze River Delta around 
Shanghai, and even in places in central China (Chung 2011). Clarke and 
Pringle (2009: 92) argued that “the capacity of workers to strike has been 
considerably increased in recent years as labor shortages have emerged.” 
Gallagher (2010) also linked the increase in labor militancy and bargaining 
power directly to the shortage of workers, arguing that these shortages are a 
function of three issues: the decline in the working population as a conse-
quence of China’s one- child policy; policy changes in agriculture (sharp 
cuts to the taxes paid by farmers and stimulus- driven increases in rural infra-
structure) that are raising the “opportunity costs” of working on the coast 
and reducing migration to the cities; and, finally, institutional discrimina-
tion against migrants as a result of the hukou system, which remains a barrier 
to the permanent migration of many rural citizens.
Besides limiting the pool of present and future workers,3 the one- child 
policy is also credited—together with overall rising prosperity—with creat-
ing a generation of workers who are temperamentally different from the pre-
vious generation on a number of levels. According to Gallagher, Kuruvilla, 
and Lee (2011: 190), young Chinese workers “tend to be better educated, 
with greater exposure to mass media, technology and more acclimated to 
city life.” More important, this second generation of migrant workers is 
far more informed of their rights and more knowledgeable about the eco-
nomic and social environment in which they live than the previous genera-
tion, and therefore they are more likely to be aggressive in pursuing their 
demands.
3 Wang (2012) noted: “The proportion of rural workers older than 40 has gone from 30 percent in 
2008 to 38.3 percent in 2011. In those three years, the average age of rural workers went from 34 to 36 
suggesting that there . . . [is] a limit to what has previously been called an ‘unlimited supply’ of migrant 
workers.”
Figure 2. A “Political Process” Model of Chinese Labor Activism 
Based on McAdam (1999)
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Increasingly, rural workers are staying closer to home. A poll of 200,000 
migrant workers in 2011 found that more chose to work in their provinces 
of birth than chose to go elsewhere (Wang 2012). Whether the labor short-
age is temporary or permanent is still being debated. While some have sug-
gested that China may be at the Lewisian turning point, in which labor 
scarcity begins to shift the economy away from labor intensive, input- driven 
growth toward enhanced productivity, declining inequality, and greater do-
mestic consumption, K. Chan (2010) has argued that the country has not 
yet reached such a point but is experiencing a series of shorter- term mis-
matches of ages, skills, and demand. But whether permanent or temporary, 
the shortage has served to increase labor militancy and bargaining power, 
reflected particularly in increasing demands for wages.
In the political sphere, the state’s policies regarding labor protections 
and collective bargaining serve to further increase the bargaining power of 
workers. Beginning in 2008, the government enacted a range of pro- 
labor pieces of legislation, including the Labor Contract Law, Employment 
Promotion Law, and the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, as 
well as daring municipal collective bargaining measures such as the Shen-
zhen Special Economic Zone Harmonious Labor Relations Regulations, 
which came close to recognizing a right to strike. New national Regulations 
on Consultation and Mediation for Labor Disputes in Enterprises went into 
effect in January 2012. These laws, taken together, show the state’s interest 
in channeling conflict into legitimate channels. But even when conflict 
spills out of legitimate channels, the state appears increasingly unwilling to 
punish workers. Clarke and Pringle (2009: 93) argued that “the balance be-
tween repression and concession has markedly shifted toward the latter in 
the last five years.” Though repression is likely to vary with the level of gov-
ernment and type of enterprise involved, China’s “political opportunity 
structure” for workers (Tarrow 2011) has clearly shifted since these laws 
were passed. Workers have new opportunities for pressing individual legal 
claims and, through some laws’ emphasis on collective consultation, have 
attained a shadow of legal legitimacy for collective actions.
Cognitive Cues
Consistent with McAdam’s framework, workers should receive “cognitive 
cues” that their leverage and opportunities are changing. Companies’ ef-
forts to “reverse- market” themselves as “preferred employers”—by actively 
recruiting in working- class neighborhoods (rather than waiting for desper-
ate workers to line up at factory doors), by building better dormitories, by 
publishing factory magazines, and by forming “task forces” of employee rep-
resentatives (Interviews 10, 28–30)—may be received by working people as 
powerful cues that the balance of power has shifted and that they (the work-
ers) hold greater leverage over capital than they did a decade ago. A re-
cruiter for a shoe factory who was interviewed said, “These days, people 
don’t look for jobs, the jobs look for people” (MacKinnon 2012).
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Rising earnings may send similar signals. Between 1996 and 2000, aver-
age monthly wages grew from 500 RMB to approximately 800 RMB, but be-
tween 2000 and 2007 they more than doubled to well over 2,000 RMB 
(China Labour Bulletin 2008a). The government has decreed that “the av-
erage growth of China’s minimum wages should be at least 13 percent” 
through 2015 and should constitute “40 percent of average local salaries” by 
that year (China Post 2012). In 2010, strikes led to wage increases of 500 to 
800 RMB at two Guangdong Honda plants; wages doubled the same year at 
the electronics giant Foxconn, following a string of worker suicides (Culpan 
2010; Butollo and ten Brink 2012). Though wage growth slowed somewhat 
in 2012 (Reuters 2013), and Chinese workers struggle with rising inflation, 
changes of this order cannot go unnoticed.
Equally important, media coverage of the new labor laws and greater re-
porting on strikes may provide cues that more activism is tolerated by au-
thorities. The 2008 Labor Contract Law was preceded by an unprecedented 
public debate that drew in foreign chambers of commerce and unions 
(Gallagher and Dong 2011). After the law’s enactment, domestic media re-
ported on workers who successfully used the law “as a weapon.” Stockmann 
and Gallagher (2011) noted that by telling gritty stories of mistreatment 
and eventual redemption through arbitration and court, Chinese state 
newspapers both attract readers and increase trust in the efficacy of legal 
activism. Partially as a result of both the preimplementation debate and 
postimplementation news coverage of the Labor Contract Law, attendance 
at legal trainings held by labor NGOs in the Pearl River Delta spiked in early 
2008.4
Crucially, besides encouraging coverage of new labor laws and successful 
legal cases, the state has also allowed more open discussion of industrial 
strife. The year 2008 marked the rollout of China’s “Control 2.0” approach 
(Bandurski 2008) to media and public opinion: Communist Party Secretary 
Hu Jintao called for “releasing authoritative information at the earliest mo-
ment, raising timeliness, increasing transparency, and firmly grasping the 
initiative in news propaganda work.” In other words, rather than simply 
blocking coverage of (all) instances of unrest, the new policy is for the state- 
controlled media to pre- empt critical coverage by reporting on “mass inci-
dents” before anyone else and framing incidents in the “correct” light. As a 
result, strikes and protests by workers have received increased reportage, 
albeit with a party- approved slant, such as a special emphasis on local offi-
cials’ mediation of conflicts. This has meant that workers hear more about 
other workers’ activism than ever before.
Given these cognitive cues—reverse- marketing by employers, rising wages, 
wide public discussion of labor laws, positive news stories on labor litigation, 
and new policies on reporting mass incidents in a prompt manner—we 
should expect “cognitive liberation” to take place. Workers should demand 
4 One of the authors was then responsible for the China programming of a foreign labor rights advo-
cacy group and was able to observe the excitement generated by the law firsthand.
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higher wages, more attention to the details of working life, and greater re-
spect. There ought to be higher levels of strike and protest activity in all 
parts of China, not just the coastal areas. Cognizant of their new leverage 
and opportunities, workers should show signs of a new tactical aggressive-
ness, too, such as through more coordinated strikes. We would also expect 
to see increases in other forms of protest.
Data and Methods
To determine whether “cognitive liberation” is taking place, we use three 
sources of data in this article. First, given the absence of any official statistics 
on labor activism in China and the limits of existing estimates by scholars 
and civil society groups, we develop our own data. Manfred Elfstrom main-
tains a unique website titled China Strikes (http://chinastrikes.crowdmap 
.com) that documents strikes and protests by Chinese workers in a format 
that is accessible to the public. “Protests” (not just strikes) are included be-
cause Chinese workers often resort to dramatic street actions—marching, 
blocking roads, holding banners outside government agencies—instead of 
or in addition to halting production, in hopes that the state will intervene 
(Su and He 2010). For a protest or strike to make it into this database, it 
should be clear that the workers involved engaged in collective action and 
that their grievances were clearly related to their employment relationship. 
China Strikes includes a total of 763 strikes and protests occurring between 
January 1, 2008, and December 31, 2012, and is constantly being updated.
Given that China lacks a clear set of newspapers that can serve as reliable 
barometers of unrest and no foreign papers provide consistent coverage, 
data gathering for the website is necessarily ad hoc. All of the scholars men-
tioned in our literature review use similar approaches, but they draw on dif-
ferent sources. While Chen (2009) relied mainly on the news archive of the 
Central News Agency in Taiwan and a variety of Internet- based sources, 
Wedeman (2009) stuck to the “international media” (including Xinhua). 
China Labour Bulletin’s strike map (2011 to present) and its regular research 
reports (the most recent of which, released in 2012, covers the years 2000 to 
2010) have used Chinese newspapers’ websites, new dissident blogs (e.g., 
Jasmine Places and Jasmine Revolution), and information from the organi-
zation’s call- in radio show. China Strikes differs in that we additionally 
 include individual tip- offs about incidents that come in through the 
site’s crowd- mapping submission form, as well as a greater array of English- 
language web materials. After comparing our data with that of China Labour 
Bulletin, we found several strikes listed in their reports and map that did not 
show up in our site, and vice versa. We have therefore added CLB data to 
China Strikes.5 Thus, though the trends we find are broadly consistent with 
5 Because the CLB strike map, in particular, captured many incidents missed by China Strikes, the in-
clusion of their data led to a sharp rise in the overall incidents captured by China Strikes from 2011 on-
ward. The resulting ratio of China Strikes data from 2008 to 2011 versus post- 2011 may therefore be 
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those observed by these other researchers, the data used in this article are 
likely the highest publicly available count of strikes and protests nationwide 
by workers during the period 2008 to 2012. Table 1 compares our data set to 
those of the others mentioned.
The China Strikes data allows us to examine different subsets of activism. 
We focus on three subsets in particular: strikes over higher wages, over work 
hours, and over respect. Activism over higher wages includes any incident in 
which workers demanded increased pay without reference to legal mini-
mums and not in response to a pay cut. Work hours activism includes strikes 
and protests over work hours, speedups, and holidays. Finally, activism over 
respect includes incidents that featured demands concerning verbal or 
physical abuse by managers or a more general perception by workers that 
human resource policies at their worksite were flawed. As it is often impos-
sible to determine from news or blog reports which single demand was the 
most important in a given action—workers have no independent union to 
sum up their positions, so different workers interviewed typically highlight 
different grievances—incidents are coded according to each and every de-
mand raised (including several demands that are not the focus of this arti-
cle). This leads to 31 instances of overlap between the three subsets discussed 
here. Fifteen of these overlaps involve strikes that feature both demands for 
higher wages and better work hours. Because our interest is in change in 
the frequency with which different grievances are being articulated and not 
the relationships between different demands (an intriguing topic in its own 
right), these overlaps should not present any complications.
We acknowledge several shortcomings with this data. First, it certainly un-
derreports the level of unrest, as many labor incidents in the country are 
not reported by the media, bloggers, or tipsters.6 After all, the state’s open-
ness toward the media is a recent and evolving position. Second, our data 
somewhat skewed toward later dates, when the power of two groups of data collectors was combined. In 
the rare instances in which we did not add CLB- recorded incidents, this was because they were not clearly 
collective strikes and protests but instead were individual grievances, or seemed more litigious than con-
tentious.
6 For example, a strike wave that allegedly included dozens of enterprises in Dalian in 2010 shows up 
as only one incident in China Strikes, because information on only one of the actions could be located 
online.
Table 1. Number of Strikes and Protests by Workers in Four Studies
Variable
Wedeman
1990–2008
Chen
1997–2007
CLB
2000–2010
China Strikes
2008–2012
Number of incidents 345 355 553 763
Number of years 18 10 10 5
Number of months 216 120 120 60
Strikes per month 1.59 2.95 4.60 12.72
Strikes per year 19.16 29.58 46.08 152.60
Sources: Wedeman (2009), Chen (2009), China Labour Bulletin (2012), China 
Strikes (2012).
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could be skewed toward coastal areas where the media has greater access 
and where citizens are more connected to the Internet, as well as toward 
greater reporting on those strikes that disrupt life outside the factory gates, 
such as bus and taxi work stoppages, and strikes in foreign firms (which may 
be less “sensitive”) as opposed to SOEs. The large number of inland inci-
dents captured, however, speaks to greater documentation than might be 
expected, and there is no obvious reason why changes in worker demands 
as recorded by China Strikes should be systematically biased.
Our second source of data are two case studies of strikes in plants oper-
ated by a multinational aeronautics firm with more than 17,000 employees 
in China. The plants, located in Chengdu, the capital of the southwestern 
province Sichuan, and Zhuzhou, a major transportation junction in the cen-
tral province Hunan, employ 405 and 320 skilled workers, respectively. Here 
we rely on internal corporate reports and interviews with five of the compa-
ny’s global industrial managers in March 2012, as well as two human re-
sources personnel on- site in June 2012. The Chengdu plant, a joint venture 
with a state- owned engine company, makes components for commercial en-
gines. The Zhuzhou plant, also a joint venture with a state- owned plant, 
manufactures integrally bladed rotors (IBRs), shafts, and cases for engines, 
which “are not simple parts; IBRs are about as tough as it gets . . . complex 
machines . . . and tough material machines, also” (Interview 34). In the 
words of one of the firm’s global industrial relations managers, the workers 
in both places do not “do the sort of work where you can necessarily bring 
in . . . hundreds of folks from the farms and just sort of put them on an as-
sembly line and they go make things; it is very highly skilled aerospace ma-
chining, which . . . requires a certain skill set” (Interview 33). Earnings are 
relatively high, and turnover is low (less than 2% per year). The average age 
is about 30 years, and these workers are not housed on- site but live in the 
surrounding communities, where they have hukou or local household regis-
tration.
We acknowledge that these are not representative cases. Neither of these 
plants fits the stereotype of Chinese production as mere assembly for ex-
port; they are sophisticated enterprises composed of a blue- collar labor 
aristocracy. As such, the cases may be considered outliers. However, the con-
formance of these outliers with trends we observe across other sectors 
should add strength to our argument. Moreover, the cases provide an im-
portant window on Chinese workers’ changing attitudes and tactics, since 
activism in top firms is likely to be emulated by less- skilled workers.
Our third source of data is a series of 30 interviews conducted with a vari-
ety of Chinese employment relations stakeholders between June and July 
2011. These included managers, labor activists, laid- off SOE employees, fac-
tory auditors, and labor scholars. Managers are the first group to feel the 
impact of any change in workers’ attitudes; labor activists interact daily with 
workers and hear their most serious concerns; laid- off SOE employees can 
make clear contrasts between their own conditions and activism and those 
of today’s young people; and factory auditors, in this case “corporate social 
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responsibility” (CSR) auditors hired by major brands, have extensive experi-
ence with a variety of workplaces and worker willingness to share problems 
with outsiders. These interviews can all be classified as “outside looking in” 
views of Chinese workers’ changing attitudes—not the views one might ob-
tain through interviewing young workers themselves. As such, they provide 
a strong measure of change in labor’s position over a long period of time; 
such a measure might not be obtained through interviews with people who 
are the agents of change. Interviewees were contacted via “snowball sam-
pling,” and the conversations took a “semi- structured” form, meaning that 
core questions of interest to us were covered but in an order and manner 
determined by the flow of the discussion (Bernard 2006). Notes from the 
interviews were openly and axially coded (Strauss and Corbin 1990). We ac-
company our interviews, case studies, and China Strikes information with 
data from the news and secondary sources. Throughout the article, we at-
tempt to triangulate between these sources, whenever possible. Different 
forms of data—quotes, descriptive statistics, and event narratives—are com-
bined to produce most of our findings.
Results
Strike Rates and Distribution
Our database identifies 763 industrial actions between January 1, 2008, and 
December 31, 2012. Table 2 suggests a steadily increasing trend in strikes, 
from 3.6 actions per month in 2008 to 32.1 actions per month in 2012. Of 
course, this growth is likely partially an artifact of increased media report-
ing, but while the media has opened up in recent years, it is unlikely to have 
done so in such a linear fashion. In fact, the big “break” in coverage came at 
the beginning of our time frame, in 2008. We expect that incidents and cov-
erage are correlated enough to accurately convey a general rise. Apart from 
a general increase in strikes, we find that, although strikes and protests are 
reported with particular frequency in the Pearl River Delta, labor unrest oc-
curs at a high rate throughout China; that is, a distinct regional pattern is 
Table 2. Strikes and Protests by Workers, January 2008 to June 2012
Year
Number 
of strikes
Number (and %) 
of strikes for 
higher wages 
Number (and %) 
of strikes 
over hours, 
speedups, etc.
Number (and %) 
of strikes 
over respect
Average number of 
strikes per month
2008  43 3  (7.0) 5 (11.6) 1 (2.3)  3.6
2009  29 8 (27.6) 0 (00.0) 0 (0.0)  2.4
2010  79 35 (44.3) 8 (10.1) 4 (3.8)  6.6
2011 227 42 (18.5) 24 (10.6) 13 (5.3) 18.9
2012 385 88 (22.86) 9  (5.2) 9 (5.5) 32.1
Total 763 176 (23.0) 46 (6.0) 27 (3.5)
Source: China Strikes (2012).
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less pronounced than previously suggested. (See Figure 3 for a plot of the 
geographic distribution.)
Causes of Strikes and Protests
Contrary to the depiction of collective actions by Chinese workers as “defen-
sive,” our data support the arguments of a small number of scholars that an 
upsurge in more “offensive” strikes is underway, although more traditional 
demands, such as for payment of wage arrears persist. Specifically, we find 
a rise in demands for more money, better working conditions, and more 
respect, that is, the traditional concerns of workers and trade unions every-
where.
The centrality of demands for more money is apparent in both our data 
set and our interviews. A full 176 out of 763 strikes and protests in China 
Strikes reflect demands for higher earnings rather than legal minimums, 
wage arrears, or the reversal of wage cuts, with almost all such demonstra-
tions (165) occurring from 2010 onward. Although defensive calls for pay-
ment of wage arrears, in particular, persist, the percentage of industrial 
actions featuring “offensive” demands rose from 7% in 2008 to 44.3% in 
2010, the year that a strike at a Honda plant in Guangdong sparked a wave 
Figure 3. Geographic Distribution of Strikes and Protests by Workers, 2008–2012
Source: China Strikes (2002), using Google Maps: https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com.
Note: Strikes for higher wages are in black.
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of aggressive auto factory strikes, before settling down to 22.9% for the 
whole of 2012. (But note that 31.2% of incidents in the first half of 2012 
were offensive.) Figure 3 shows that the distribution of strikes and protests 
featuring such demands crosses regional boundaries. (Demonstrations for 
higher wages are marked in dark black.)
Our interview results are consistent with this view. Today’s employees are 
less easily satisfied monetarily than were previous generations. This attitude 
is understood as “moneygrubbing” by older workers and factory managers. 
A member of a group of laid- off SOE workers in Guizhou, reflecting on the 
difference between themselves and their children, had the following to say: 
“Everyone is focused on earning money now. In the past, you got a bit of 
social support and you felt you were doing something for your country. You 
would even do some stuff as a volunteer. . . . Now, if you’re not paid, you 
don’t do anything” (Interviews 12–18). Echoing this assessment but from a 
different perspective, a foreign apparel factory manager noted, “Workers 
want 1,500 RMB for just their training period, when they aren’t doing any-
thing for the company. In the past, they didn’t make any demands at all. 
They were happy to have air- conditioning” (Interview 10). In some in-
stances, such as those described in our two case studies below, workers have 
sought to keep up with rising wages in nearby factories. Clearly, workers are 
acting on cognitive cues such as those presented in McAdam’s framework.
Workers do not just strike and protest for more money, though. A CSR 
team noted that workers’ complaints are now more “pointed” (jian rui): 
“Now, they will bring up ‘overtime’ and other, more specific issues. They 
now dispute speedups without corresponding pay” (Interviews 28–30). In 
the words of an official from the Hubei Federation of Trade Unions (HFTU), 
“They [workers] care about new things, like time to rest. If they’ve earned 
enough, they want time for themselves” (Interview 26). Besides overtime 
and rest, a number of other details of work conditions appear to cause 
worker dissatisfaction. The same apparel factory owner quoted above also 
lamented to the authors, “Workers get angry about missing documents. Ev-
erything has to be in writing now. ‘Don’t say it, write it’” (Interview 10). The 
percentage of strikes due to work hours has held steady at around 10 to 
11%, with the exception of low points in 2008 and the first half of 2012. We 
suspect that data covering a longer time span would show an uptake com-
pared with the 1990s and early 2000s.
Finally, workers are more likely than in the past to demand something 
more intangible: respect. The apparel factory boss said that workers are 
“definitely more easily offended now” and that, in order to retain employ-
ees, he “has to make people proud of their jobs, make them feel like they 
are highly qualified seamstresses” (Interview 10). According to an activist in 
the Pearl River Delta who has helped workers file legal cases, “It is now no 
longer just about money or about winning the case. . . . They will fight for 
their ‘face’ and status” (Interview 21). The HFTU official quoted above 
agreed: “They don’t just want a job . . . but also want respect” (Interview 26). 
A Wuhan- based activist who had previously worked in Guangdong made a 
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regional distinction, though: “In the south, people will say they’re suing 
their company for ‘face’ or for ‘respect’ or because they want ‘their labor 
respected’ or ‘workers respected,’” whereas in places like Wuhan, the focus 
is more on “small, purely money demands” (Interview 25). Chan (2001) re-
corded several instances of managerial abuse that sparked outrage in the 
1990s, but these tend to involve extreme abuse—for example, foreign bosses 
forcing workers to kneel in the sun. Workers now appear to be focusing on 
more routine interactions (e.g., Li and Liu 2012). In our aggregate data, the 
percentage of strikes and protests explicitly featuring “respect” demands—
relating to physical or verbal violence by managers, poor human resource 
practices, and the like—rose from 2.3% in 2008 to 5.5% in 2012. Clearly, 
therefore, the results are consistent with our predictions based on McAdam’s 
model that point to a new aggressiveness on the part of Chinese workers.
Rising Worker Militancy
Consistent with our framework, it would appear that the increase in strikes 
and protests is part of a general increase in worker militancy. At the most 
basic level, workers are exercising their “exit” (as opposed to “voice”) options 
(Hirschmann 1970), leaving employers who offer subpar wages or who are 
abusive. The factory boss quoted above estimated his plant’s turnover at 20%, 
up from next to zero “back in the day,” when he first began manufacturing in 
China, and the boss said that 20% was low compared with his competitors, 
who were experiencing 60 to 70% turnover (Interview 10). An SOE worker 
interviewed for this article said, “People don’t learn skills, they switch jobs 
constantly” (Interviews 12–18). Such comments were echoed by a survey of 
108 foreign- invested manufacturers in China by the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Shanghai and Booz & Company (2009: 19), which found that 
60 respondents had “difficulty in finding and retaining reliable personnel.” 
A full 34% of the businessmen interviewed, moreover, rated “poor employee 
retention” as one of their “top three” issues in 2007; this figure only dropped 
to 19% in 2008–09, during the height of the financial crisis layoffs (23).
Workers are also engaging in what Scott (1985) called “everyday acts of 
resistance” using “weapons of the weak.” One factory boss said, “It’s not so 
much that there are different demands by workers. The behavior of today’s 
workers is different. Not steaming ahead, not as hard working” (Interview 
10). The boss added that new incentives, including negative ones such as 
the threat of revoking housing and food subsidies, were now required to 
force employees to meet his factory’s standards (Interview 10). He also com-
plained of increased “aggression” from workers, of a greater potential for 
violence over small disagreements; to protect against this, his factory has 
had to install 280 surveillance cameras. An activist similarly worried that “if 
no one steps in to represent workers, things will develop in an increasingly 
violent direction” (Interview 23). It should be noted, though, that reports of 
violence by police, factory security guards, and hired thugs against workers 
far outnumber reports of violence by workers themselves in our data set.
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In addition, workers are taking increased advantage of emergent institu-
tions outside the state and party- backed mass organizations. One activist in 
the southeast said workers used to be suspicious of his NGO when he would 
contact them, but now “they actually call and request materials” (Interview 
20). The CSR auditor noted: “Five years ago, when we conducted CSR au-
dits, most workers said what their bosses wanted them to say. . . . When we 
investigate factories now, workers say what they want to, tell the truth, ex-
plain their factories’ actual conditions, say things they wouldn’t say in the 
past” (Interviews 28–30). Wang (2011) said civil society activists were an im-
portant element in the 2010 Honda strikes. This sort of outreach shows a 
new savvy on the part of workers.
Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests increased coordination of strikes 
and protests, better organization, and a more strategic focus. The first inci-
dent in the 2010 strike wave at Honda auto parts plants was perfectly 
placed in the company’s supply chain, shutting down the firm’s operations 
nationwide, and it involved extended negotiations led, on the workers’ 
side, by worker- elected representatives and by pro- worker academics. 
Workers at more than 20 other auto plants followed suit (IHLO 2010). 
The academics involved were impressed by the workers’ “complicated pro-
cess of choosing goals” and “strong collective consciousness” (Interviews 
6–8; see also Meng and Lu 2013). In November 2011, employees at Pepsi 
bottling plants in at least five widely separated cities (Changsha, Fuzhou, 
Chongqing, Nanchang, and Chengdu) held a coordinated leave- taking 
protest on the same day (China Labour Bulletin 2011b), while in July 2012, 
workers in Wanzhou, Chongqing, and Huizhou all struck on the same day 
over a leadership change at NVC Lighting (see, e.g., X. Li 2012). If the auto 
strike wave spread by demonstration effects and emulation, what Tarrow 
(2005) called “non- relational diffusion” (albeit within factories supplying 
the same companies), then the Pepsi, Motorola, and NVC Lighting waves 
seems to have been guided by neither “relational diffusion” (where the 
participants know each other or are part of the same networks) nor en-
tirely “non- relational diffusion” but rather simply well- organized online 
outreach. This coordination contrasts sharply with the depictions of prior 
literature.
All of these tactics—strikes, “everyday resistance,” and seeking out exter-
nal organizations—are best viewed as expressions of workers’ new empower-
ment, not as themselves catalysts of that empowerment. In making their new 
demands for better pay, for greater attention to the details of working life, 
and for more respect, while employing new tactics, workers appear to be 
responding to the cognitive cues described here. For example, several inter-
viewees noted the effect of media coverage of the Honda strike on workers’ 
sense of possibility. An NGO leader in the Pearl River Delta, said, “The 
Honda strike, in particular, gave workers a new momentum. It awakened 
them” (Interview 20). According to another, “The Honda strike had a big 
impact on workers’ opinions, because of the media attention given to the 
strike. Similar strikes occurred in the past, but without the same attention” 
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(Interview 21). The importance of other cues, especially rising wages, is 
shown in the case studies below.
Evidence from Case Studies
The trends that come through in our interview and China Strikes data are 
also evident in the results of our mini case studies of the Chengdu and 
 Zhuzhou aerospace factories.7 A summary of the case results can be found 
in Table 3.
The Chengdu Case
The Chengdu plant was different from most of the worksites discussed in 
the incidents documented above. Many of the facility’s employees previ-
ously belonged to a state- owned enterprise that entered into the current 
joint venture with the international firm. These workers were given a 
7 Out of a commitment to the anonymity of our interviewees, only one of the two incidents used as mini 
case studies is included in the China Strikes data set. The one that is included in China Strikes appears 
in other online reports, but on China Strikes it has been scrubbed of any identifiers beyond those used 
in this article.
Table 3. Chengdu and Zhuzhou Case Studies
City, ownership, 
and number of 
employees Reasons for strike Demands Action Role of union Result
Chengdu
Joint venture
405
Performance 
bonus cut
Transfer of fac-
tory across city
Neighboring fac-
tories catching 
up in terms of 
wages
Restoration of 
performance 
bonus
Transfer com-
pensation 
based on ser-
vice before 
joint venture
Three-week 
strike fol-
lowed by 
two-week 
slowdown
Telling company 
about planned 
strike
Ineffectively 
urging work-
ers to return 
to work
Indirect in-
crease in bo-
nuses
Older, pre–joint 
venture em-
ployees com-
pensated for 
past service
Net wage in-
creases of 
37%
Zhuzhou
Joint venture
320
Performance 
bonus cut
Termination of 
worker for as-
saulting man-
ager
Local manage-
ment team ir-
regularities
Restoration of 
incentive 
bonus
More communi-
cation on pay 
issues
Different pro-
cess for nego-
tiation
Transparent ac-
counting of 
local manag-
ers’ failures
Small act of 
violence
Work to 
grievance 
procedure 
rule via a 
two-day 
“dive”
Staff and Work-
ers Represen-
tative Con-
gress leads 
action
Negotiating a 
new agree-
ment via the 
Staff and 
Workers Rep-
resentative 
Congress
Promise of prior 
announce-
ment of pay 
changes
One month’s 
supplemental 
wage payment
No retaliation 
against strik-
ing workers
More open and 
honest com-
munication
Share report on 
actions taken 
against cor-
rupt managers
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one- time severance payment for their previous service in the SOE when they 
joined the new entity. While there were a few “senior individuals” among 
the workers, the “majority of the workforce” were in their mid- 30s (Inter-
view 34).
Two incidents sparked discord at the factory. First, in June 2009, the 
Chengdu government announced that, owing to housing pressures, the 
plant would have to relocate from near the city center to a suburb, resulting 
in an increased commute of an hour to an hour and a half for the workers, 
who lived in neighborhoods close to the old plant. The older workers, in 
particular, believed they deserved compensation for the move—including 
compensation for their service to the previous SOE, despite the one- time pay-
ment they were given when the joint venture began. Second, in September 
2009, management announced a decrease in the factory’s performance 
bonus due to what was deemed a drop in effort, although the New Year 
bonus of 2,000 RMB was paid as usual in January 2010. The workers, led by 
a core of older employees, went on strike in February and March for three 
weeks.
Rather than immediately raising wages or, alternately, cracking down on 
the protesters, as occurred in other parts of China at the same time, man-
agement waited, promising a consideration of the workers’ concerns at a 
later date. It urged employees to return to work with promises of nonretali-
ation. Phone calls were made to individual workers, and the protesters were 
allowed into the plant for bathroom breaks. But menacing private security 
guards were also hired. Slowly, discussions with a small group of workers 
started. Others then trickled back. Workers had to re- sign their contract 
commitments as a condition of regaining their work. The enterprise’s union 
branch played a marginal role; in a well- worn pattern for the All China 
 Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), it tipped management off about the 
strike and encouraged workers to resume production (Interview 31).
After the workers resumed work, base pay was increased and “special” 
bonuses were added; senior employees were bought out at an “in- between” 
level that partially acknowledged their pre–joint venture years of service. 
The senior workers were not completely happy with their settlement, how-
ever, and the problem regarding the relocation of the factory was not 
resolved fully. After a follow- up slowdown by workers in May 2010, com-
pensation was increased again. In total, the base wage was raised 8.8%; over-
time was adjusted 12.2% in line with the base wage; a “special bonus” of 50% 
replaced a “monthly bonus” of 41%; and other bonuses were increased 
25%, for an overall pay raise of 37%. Ninety- five percent of employees 
agreed to move to the new plant location, and company buses now trans-
port the employees from their homes in the old factory’s neighborhood 
(Interview 35).
The Zhuzhou Case
The disputes at the Zhuzhou facility were rooted in a long history of mis-
trust but began most concretely July 2011, when an employee assaulted a 
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manager with a metal bar over not receiving a merit pay increase. When the 
worker was terminated, there was a 28- hour slowdown; “people stayed at 
their work stations, they didn’t walk out in the street with posters and that 
. . . but they refused to work” (Interview 33). According to an official with 
the company, “Having someone that assaults his manager is something, but 
knowing that . . . our shop floor employees were supportive of this employee 
was a kind of surprise for us, and this was where we started being a bit con-
cerned about, what is the issue in this shop? Is there something behind it 
that is more significant?” (Interview 33). The company started a dialogue 
process with an ombudsman and focus groups.
While this process was ongoing, a “multifunctional” quality and ac-
counting audit was also underway to assess the factory’s compliance with 
the corporation’s standards. Problems were found with preventative 
equipment maintenance, reimbursements for false receipts for managers 
(used as a form of motivation), and “fudged” numbers in factory docu-
ments. “The employees really saw that something was wrong” (Interview 
33). The general mismanagement of the factory was compounded in their 
eyes by issues of favoritism and “perceived lack of respect from the man-
agement team.” At the end of the year, as investigators finalized recom-
mendations for the factory, local managers announced that there would 
be no incentive compensation payouts for 2011 because of the quality is-
sues that had been discovered, issues that workers felt were the fault of 
management, not line employees. A two- day work stoppage then com-
menced in January.
Using the company’s “root cause corrective action” procedures, the union 
gathered workers in the canteen to do a “deep dive” (an English- language 
term used by the international firm’s managers—the Chinese translation is 
unknown) about why there was no payout (Interviews 31–34). According to 
an official, “When we would say, OK, go back to work, they would say, ‘We’re 
not done with our root cause activity.’ So, it was quite a clever trick that I 
hope that one of our more mature unions doesn’t someday decide to em-
ploy” (Interview 32). The union reached out to the Zhuzhou Municipal 
Federation of Trade Unions, which said their tactics were “not the way to 
go” and instead recommended third- party mediation—something the com-
pany had no experience with in the Chinese context and was reluctant to try 
and that the union felt comfortable ignoring. In the end, the enterprise- 
level union made a list of demands, including, in addition to bonus- plan 
changes, nonretaliation against workers who participated in the “dive,” 
more open and honest communications with the company in the future, 
and, importantly, a report on what action would be taken against the local 
management team for various irregularities, not just in regard to pay and 
human resource strategies but also in regard to the quality and accounting 
audit. “Western- style” negotiations with the factory’s 22- member Staff and 
Workers’ Representative Congress resolved the stoppage. (Twenty- one out 
of 22 members agreed to the company’s offers, and one abstained; eight of 
the members belonged to a union negotiating team.) Workers received a 
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one- time supplemental payment of one month’s wages and a commitment 
to notification 10 days prior to any change to the merit- pay plan.
Analysis of Case Studies
Despite the capital- intensive and highly skilled nature of production in both 
cases, the dynamics of protest appear quite consistent with McAdam’s pre-
dictions and our quantitative and other interview results. Workers in both 
Chengdu and Zhuzhou made wage and bonus demands without reference 
to the minimum wage or unpaid overtime. The strikes suggest an increased 
focus on details and process issues. This took the form of calls for payments 
according to factory tenure and compensation for work travel in Chengdu, 
disputes about bonus plans in both plants, and, in the Zhuzhou case, scru-
tiny of the competence and honesty of local managers, coupled with at-
tention to the very processes by which negotiations between labor and 
management took place. One manager, reflecting on the Zhuzhou case, ex-
pressed surprise: “One of the things in China, from the experience that I’ve 
had until now, is that policies, procedures, that type of stuff, you sort of 
agree on after negotiations—they’re not normally part of the negotiation 
process” (Interview 33). The global labor relations director for the company 
noted that “pride” was important, especially in Chengdu, where demands 
for respect sprang, perhaps, from the plant’s roots in the state economy (In-
terview 31).
The main “cognitive cue” driving workers to strike at the Chengdu 
plant was rising salaries in surrounding factories that ate away at the work-
ers’ sense of still being “premium” employees (Interview 31). Similarly, in 
 Zhuzhou, a company official noted, “We’ve always been a good payer; we’re 
not below the market. In fact, in the past . . . when we first started there ten 
or fifteen years ago . . . we paid significantly more than other industries,” 
such as other facilities run by the company’s state- owned joint venture part-
ner. “Over time,” however, the partner “has caught up to our salaries.” Thus, 
“there was that in the backdrop, as well: the perception that they [the em-
ployees] had been hard done by because everyone had caught up to them 
and now they weren’t earning significantly more than the others” (Interview 
32). In both factories workers received considerable raises following their 
strikes, reinforcing the earlier cognitive cues. In addition to rising local 
wages, changing political opportunities were a catalyst for all these demands. 
Police do not seem to have intervened significantly; private security guards 
had to be hired in Chengdu, for example. The Zhuzhou union’s unusual 
activism, which adds to the reports of tentative ACFTU reform by other 
scholars (Howell 2008; Liu 2010; Chen 2010), no doubt provided a power-
ful cue regarding the legitimacy of collective action.
Consistent with our interviews with managers, laid- off SOE workers, fac-
tory auditors, and trade union officials, the data from these two case studies 
show a working class that is proactive in its demands and sophisticated in 
its tactics. In both places, in the words of the company’s global industrial 
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relations director, the demand was “not about rights, not about other things” 
but rather about it being “time to get some more!” (Interview 31). He adds, 
“The industrial relations climate in China continues to evolve on an almost 
daily basis.”
Conclusions
The central finding in this article is that a qualitative shift is underway in the 
nature of Chinese labor unrest. The evidence from data, interviews, and 
cases is broadly consistent with our adaption of McAdam’s (1999) “political 
process” model. As a result of economic and political changes and the cues 
they have sent to workers (in the form of higher wages, new recruiting prac-
tices, and greater media coverage of labor unrest), workers appear to be 
demanding more pay and increased respect, while also paying attention to 
workplace details. They are also employing new tactics in their activism. 
These would not be dramatic claims in other contexts, but in China, while 
conflict has long been intense, workers have until recently been understood 
to be focused on largely “defensive” demands. Consistent with Gompers’s 
(1893) comment, Chinese workers now appear to “want more.”
Three objections may be raised to our argument. First, although we inter-
pret workers’ demands for higher wages as evidence of “workers going on 
the offensive,” an alternative interpretation is that these are actually “defen-
sive” demands, in that workers are simply trying to keep real earnings con-
stant given that inflation has risen dramatically in recent years, with the 
exception of a brief dip at the beginning of the recession,8 and several of 
the reports that serve as a basis for our data set quote workers as complain-
ing about prices. Our case studies, however, demonstrate a holistic change 
in workers’ demands that goes beyond wages: our interviews and China 
Strikes data show simultaneous rises in demands regarding job “details” and 
“respect.” Moreover, in many recent incidents, the pay hikes received by 
strikers and protesters have far exceeded what would be required to keep 
up with inflation. The Honda strikers, for example, did not stop their action 
when offered a raise of a few percentage points. Finally, it should be noted 
that inflation has been a constant feature of postreform China, but previous 
generations of workers struck and protested on very different grounds.
Second, it may be argued that our data do not capture regional dynamics 
adequately or the different interactions workers may have with different lev-
els of government. We acknowledge this shortcoming and urge others to 
replicate our research but with greater attention to these dynamics. Finally, 
some may find that our model does not give workers enough agency, paint-
ing them instead as passive recipients of structural cues. It is not our 
8 According to the World Bank, China’s annual CPI inflation rose from 4.8 to 5.9% between 2007 and 
2008, crashed into the negative zone (–0.7%) in 2009, following the global financial crisis, and rose again 
to 3.3% in 2010 (World Bank 2012). In July 2011, CPI hit a high of 6.5%, according to Chinese govern-
ment figures (Rafiei 2012).
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intention to downplay the bravery and ingenuity of Chinese labor activists. 
We have not investigated the bonds formed by workers on the picket line; 
that is, we have not engaged the “indigenous organizations” component of 
McAdam’s model, but future research should focus on the sorts of collective 
action spurred by various worker- led bodies: grassroots NGOs and native- 
place associations (the right- hand side of Figure 2).
Our use of McAdam’s model helps us understand inflection points in 
worker activism under conditions of repression. Existing industrial relations 
theory focuses on strike rates within stable, formalized bargaining relation-
ships. Chinese strikes are all wildcat strikes. The study of such activism 
 requires greater attention to how individual workers interpret their envi-
ronment, that is, take in cues. The presence of independent unions may 
eventually be required in China in order to reinforce these scattered inter-
pretations and turn them into a sustained movement. For now, Chinese 
workers must rely on themselves and, again, perhaps NGOs and native- place 
associations.
This article confirms and adds to the strand of the literature that is begin-
ning to argue that Chinese workers are showing a new level of assertiveness. 
One key question for future research will be to examine whether differ-
ences in strike behavior between migrant and SOE workers continue to 
exist. A second question lies in the dark black arrows leading back from 
“new tactics” to the “new structural and political opportunities” in McAdam’s 
model in Figure 2. Workers’ current “offensive” activism may change the op-
portunities for further action in a positive—or negative—direction. A circu-
lar relationship between laws and action may exist, one that makes defining 
the direction of causality difficult and raises issues of endogeneity. For now, 
though, this circular relationship seems to be a “virtuous” cycle for workers. 
A contraction of the country’s economy or the enactment of repressive poli-
cies could lead to more defensive or cautious worker demands. Thus, 
whether the nature of Chinese labor unrest changes again going forward 
warrants scholarly attention.
Appendix
Interviews with ER Stakeholders
Interview 1: Academic, June 2011, Beijing
Interview 2: Labor activist, June 2011, Beijing
Interview 3: Academic, June 2011, Beijing
Interview 4: Academic, June 2011, Beijing
Interview 5: Academic, June 2011, Beijing
Interviews 6–8: Group interview with academic and students, June 2011, Beijing
Interview 9: Academic, June 2011, Chongqing
Interview 10: Apparel factory manager, July 2011, Pearl River Delta (via Skype)
Interview 11: Labor activist, July 2011, Guiyang
Interviews 12–18: Group interview with laid- off SOE workers, July 2012, Kaili
Interview 19: Labor activist, July 2011, Pearl River Delta
Interview 20: Labor activist, July 2011, Pearl River Delta
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Interview 21: Labor activist, July 2011, Pearl River Delta
Interview 22: Labor activist, July 2011, Pearl River Delta
Interview 23: Labor activist, July 2011, Pearl River Delta
Interview 24: Labor activist, July 2011, Hong Kong
Interview 25: Labor activist, July 2011, Wuhan
Interview 26: Trade union official, July 2011, Wuhan
Interview 27: Academic, July 2011, Beijing
Interviews 28–30: Group interview with CSR compliance auditor and assistants, July 2011, 
Tianjin
Case Study Interviews
Interview 31: Director of global labor and employee relations, February and March 2012, 
United States
Interview 32: Industrial relations manager, March 2012, United States
Interview 33: Industrial relations manager, March 2012, United States (via conference call)
Interview 34: Industrial relations manager, March 2012, United States (via conference call)
Interview 35: Industrial relations manager, March 2012, United States
Interview 36: Human resources manager, June 2012, Chengdu, China
Interview 37: Human resources supervisor, June 2012, Chengdu, China
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